POLITICAL ASYLUM AND WITHHOLDING OF
DEPORTATION: DEFINING THE APPROPRIATE
STANDARD OF PROOF UNDER THE REFUGEE ACT
OF 1980

The Refugee Act of 1980 established a "well-founded fear of

persecution" standardfor determining when an alien is eligiblefor
political asylum in the United States. The correct interpretationof
the new standardhas recently been the subject of dispute between
the Immigration and NaturalizationService and the United States
courts of appeals. This Comment analyzes the different interpretations of the "well-foundedfear" standard.It also suggests an interpretation based on the legislative history of the 1980 Act and
the recommendations of the United Nations.
INTRODUCTION

One of the oldest themes in America's history is that of welcoming
homeless refugees to its shores." Refugees from many countries have

come to America seeking refuge from persecution in their native
land.2 Since 1980, persons already physically present in the United

States are also able to request asylum and withholding of deportation to their homeland due to a fear of persecution.3 The increase in
1. S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 141, 141 [hereinafter cited as S. REP.].
2. Id. at 3. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (1982) (authorizing an annual quota of
refugees who may be admitted to the United States). The quota was set at 50,000 for
fiscal years 1980, 1981, and 1982. In 1983, the quota was raised by President Reagan to
90,000 refugees, with special concern for refugees from Viet Nam, Latin America, and
the Caribbean. Determination of President No. 83-2, 47 Fed. Reg. 46483 (1982), reprinted in 8 U.S.C.A. § 1157 app. at 60 (West Supp. 1983). In 1981 and 1982 the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) received asylum applications from nationals of 53 countries with large numbers being made by persons from Afghanistan,
Ethiopia, Haiti, Iran, Nicaragua, Poland, and El Salvador, as well as others from
Greece, Italy, Kenya, Mexico, and Sweden. Meissner, Proposed Revisions in Asylum
Proceduresand Law, 29 INS REPORTER 1 (1981).
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1982) (authorizes the establishment of procedures for granting
asylum to persons physically present in the United States or at a land border or port of
entry); 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982) (provides for withholding of deportation of aliens who
would otherwise be deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982), but because the Attorney
General has determined they would be persecuted in their homeland, they are granted a
stay from deportation; the Attorney General has discretion to determine the length of the
stay).
December 1983 Vol. 21 No. 1

the number of persons seeking asylum in the United States has created a backlog of cases numbering in the thousands." Many of these
people are confined to detention camps or have sought temporary
sanctuary in churches or in the homes of private citizens.5 The problem of how to respond to the numerous requests for asylum made
each year to the United States government has become critical over
the past three years.8
Three years ago, Congress enacted the Refugee Act of 19807 to
establish a more uniform procedure for the admission and resettle-

ment of refugees in America.8 The Refugee Act represents a comprehensive revision of former immigration laws relating to asylum.9
However, a dispute has arisen between the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals on
the one hand, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals on the other
regarding the interpretation of the new laws as intended by Congress. 10 The present conflict involves the requirements for determining when an alien is eligible for treatment as a political refugee. Specifically, a controversy exists regarding the appropriate standard of
proof the alien must meet in order to prove eligibility for asylum. 1
The dispute involves not only what elements an alien must prove, but
also the character and sufficiency of evidence needed to satisfy the

4. Pick, People Who Live On Hope - And Little Else, STUDENT LAW., May
1983, at 14. In May, 1983, there were 143,000 asylum bids pending before the INS. Id.
5. Brom, Church Sanctuary for Salvadorans, CAL. LAW., July 1983, at 42, 43.
Many of the aliens currently being held in detention camps are Salvadorans. Two
Salvadorans were granted asylum in 1981 while 10,473 were apprehended and returned
to El Salvador. In 1982, 74 Salvadorans were granted asylum and only 5,131 were deported. As of April, 1983, at least 931 Salvadorans were in detention awaiting hearing.
As a result, hundreds of churches have begun offering sanctuary to Salvadorans who
have escaped persecution and are awaiting a response from the INS as to the status of
their asylum applications. Id.
6. The INS received approximately 3,700 applications for asylum in 1978 and
another 5,800 in 1979. Between March of 1980 and July of 1981 over 53,000 applications for asylum were filed by persons physically present in the United States. Meissner,
supra note 2, at 1.
7. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.
(1982)). The Act was signed by President Carter on March 17, 1980. Id.
8. S. REP., supra note 1, at 1-2.
9. Id. at 1. Prior to the Act, Congress had taken a piecemeal approach toward
asylum legislation, passing new laws in reaction to individual refugee crises as they occurred. With the influx of large numbers of refugees in the United States in the past
decade (most notably from Indochina, Cuba, Haiti, Central America, and the Middle
East), such an approach was no longer effective in determining who should be granted
political asylum. Id. at 3.
10. See, e.g., Marroquin-Manriquez v. INS, 699 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1983), petition
for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3759 (U.S. April 7, 1983) (No. 82-1649); Stevic v. Sava,
678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3633 (U.S. Feb. 28, 1983) (No.
82-973); Rejaie v. INS, 691 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1982).
11. Stevic v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401, 404 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W.
3633 (U.S. Feb. 28, 1983) (No. 82-973); Rejaie v. INS, 691 F.2d 139, 140 (3d Cir.
1982).
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alien's burden of persuading the fact-finder.
The INS and the courts have each formulated their own interpretation of the new statute.12 The INS maintains that an alien must
prove a "clear probability" of persecution in his native land. 13 Three
federal circuit courts of appeals have held that the statute mandates
a lesser, "well-founded fear" of persecution standard.1 ' This discrepancy has resulted in substantial differences in application of the law
to individual cases where persons' lives and futures are at stake."6
The United States Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari
in a case involving the issue of whether the Refugee Act of 1980
reduced the standard of proof a non-citizen must meet in order to be
granted asylum in the United States."8 Since asylum has traditionally been very difficult to obtain,1 7 resolution of this conflict is of
great importance to the thousands of persons who seek refuge in
12. See infra notes 96-117 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the INS's position, see Rejaie v. INS, 691 F.2d 139 (3d
Cir. 1982).
14. The Second and Sixth Circuits have indicated that the "well-founded fear"
standard adopted by the Refugee Act of 1980 is a less harsh standard for proving asylum
and withholding of deportation than the "clear probability" standard. See infra notes 9699, 137-39 and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit has arguably adopted the reasoning of the Second and Sixth Circuits. McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d -1312 (9th Cir. 1981).
See also Almirol v. INS, 550 F. Supp. 253 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (in which the district court
applied the lesser "well-founded fear" of persecution standard to an alien's request for a
waiver of the two-year foreign residence requirement under § 212(e) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(e) (1982))).
15. See infra notes 137-48 and accompanying text. Other factors affect the alien's
burden of proving eligibility for asylum, most notably the political relationship between
the United States and the alien's native country. This is partly because INS regulations
require the State Department to give a recommendation in each case as to the alien's
eligibility for asylum. 8 C.F.R. § 208.7 (1983). The recommendations tend to favor refugees from countries whose governments are not on favorable terms with the United
States, such as refugees from Afghanistan or Iran as opposed to refugees from El Salvador or the Philippines. Pick, supra note 4, at 35. Also, "media-related" cases receive
extra attention. To be persecuted, one must be "targeted." A famous person, such as
tennis star Martina Navratilova or former Russian dancers Alexander Goudonov and
Mikhail Baryshnikov, are known to the government, which improves their chances of
being granted asylum. Id.
16. Stevic v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3633
(U.S. Feb. 28, 1983) (No. 82-973). The Court heard oral argument in Stevic on December 6, 1983. As of the date of this publication, no decision has been announced.
17. In the past, only a few applicants have been granted asylum. This is primarily
because asylum has always been considered a privilege rather than a right, and is discretionary with the Attorney General. See 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c) (1982). See also In re Tan,
12 I. & N. Dec. 564, 568 (1967) (stating that the statute gives the Attorney General
discretion to withhold deportation). This result was changed by making withholding of
deportation mandatory when an alien meets the requirements of the new definition of
"refugee." Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 203(e), 94 Stat. 102, 107 (1980) (amending § 243(h)
of the INA) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982)).

America each year. 8 It will also indicate the direction of America's
future refugee policy.
This Comment analyzes the standard of proof imposed upon the
alien attempting to obtain asylum in the United States under the
Refugee Act of 1980. It evaluates the positions taken by the INS
and the United States courts of appeals, most notably in the recent
decisions of Stevic v. Sava'9 and Marroquin-Manriquez v. INS20
and suggests possible solutions to the existing controversy.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

21

United States Statutes Relating to Refugees Abroad
Until the twentieth century, the United States had no laws dealing
specifically with those persons seeking to enter the United States as
refugees from other lands. 2 After World War II, Congress enacted
various provisions which provided for the admission of select groups
of refugees. The first of these acts was the Displaced Persons Act of
1948.23 This Act granted sanctuary for thousands of displaced persons who had fled Nazi or Soviet persecution as a result of events
which occurred during World War 11.24 However, the 1948 Act was
only a temporary response to an emergency2 crisis.
Congress had not
5
yet established a permanent refugee policy.
18. See Petition of Respondent INS for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing
En Banc, at 16, Stevie v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W.
3633 (U.S. Feb. 28, 1983) (No. 82-973) [hereinafter cited as Petition for Rehearing] (on
file with the San Diego Law Review). The INS suggests that if a new, more liberal
standard of proof is upheld by the courts, every asylum petition denied since passage of
The Refugee Act would be subject to reopening, creating a devastating effect upon the
processing of asylum applications.
19. 678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3633 (U.S. Feb. 28,
1983) (No. 82-973).
20. 699 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1983), petition for cert.filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3759 (U.S.
April 7, 1983) (No. 82-1649). Petitioner has requested that his case be heard in conjunction with Stevic v. Sava because it raises the same issue as Stevic, but presents a more
substantial record of facts.
21. For an exhaustive history of United States immigration law relating to refugees, see Anker & Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee
Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 9 (1981).
22. 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE §§ 1.11.2 (1979). The first hundred years of our national existence was a period of unimpeded
immigration welcoming all aliens without restrictions. Id.
23. Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948) (repealed in 1951).
24. Id.
25. See Anker & Posner, supra note 21, at 12-13. A similar provision, the Refugee
Relief Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-203, 67 Stat. 400, provided emergency relief to refugees who were victims of natural calamities or who were fleeing Communist-dominated
parts of Europe and the Middle East. The Refugee Relief Act was extended in 1957,
Pub. L. No. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639, and later codified by the 1965 Amendments to the
Immigration and Nationality Act. Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965), (current
version of the INA at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1982)). See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
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In 1952, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 2 was enacted to establish quotas and priorities for qualifying immigrants
who wished to become permanent residents of the United States.2
The INA included a defector provision allowing immigration of a
restricted number of former Communists fleeing persecution
abroad. 28 The emphasis of this measure was less on broad humanitarian goals than on giving encouragement and support to antiCommunists.29
The 1965 Amendments to the INA created the first permanent
basis for the admission of refugees.30 Section 203(a)(7) was added to
the INA. s" This section established a quota for admitting aliens fleeing Middle Eastern or Communist-dominated countries because of
persecution or fear of persecution based on race, religion, or political
opinion. 32 Until enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980, only persons
from the countries specified in section 203(a)(7) 33were allowed to apply for asylum in the United States as refugees.
26. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (currently codified at 8 U.S.C. §§
1101-1557 (1982)).
27. See Anker & Posner, supra note 21, at 14, 18.
28. Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(a)(28)(I), 66 Stat. 163, 186 (1952) (currently codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(I) (1982)). The Act also included a parole provision
which gave the Attorney General the authorization to temporarily parole aliens into the
United States in emergencies or in the public interest. Id. at § 212(d)(5) (currently codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1982)). An alien paroled into the United States need not
prove eligibility as a refugee. Parole has traditionally been used as the primary basis for
the admission of large numbers of refugees into the United States. See generally Note,
Refugees Under United States Immigration Laws, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 528 (1975)
(discussing both parole and conditional entry of refugees).
The Refugee Act of 1980 limits the use of parole authority. The new Act provides:
"The Attorney General may not parole into the United States an alien who is a refugee
unless the Attorney General determines that compelling reasons in the public interest
with respect to that particular alien require that the alien be paroled into the United
States rather than be admitted as a refugee . . . ." Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-212, § 202(f)(B), 94 Stat. 102, 108 (amending § 212(d)(5) of the INA) (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1182 (d)(5)(B) (1982)). However, a separate provision authorizes the President, after consultation with Congress and when justified by "special humanitarian concern" to parole a fixed number of refugees into the United States each year. Id. at §
201(b), 94 Stat. 102, 103 (1980) (adding § 207(a) to the INA) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1157(b) (1982)).
29. Anker & Posner, supra note 21, at 14.
30. The Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89236, 79 Stat. 911 (repealed in part 1980) (current version of the INA at 8 U.S.C. §§
1101-1557 (1982)).
31. Id. at § 203(a)(7), 79 Stat. 911, 912-15 (1965) (repealed 1980).
32. Id.
33. Id. One of the purposes of the Refugee Act of 1980 was to eliminate geographical and ideological restrictions on the admission of refugees. S. REP., supra note 1, at 4;
H. R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 19, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &

Withholding of Deportation and the Rights of Asylum Applicants
in the United States

Asylees are persons physically present in the United States who
have fled persecution in their native country.3 Before 1980, the
United States had never offered the right to apply for asylum to
aliens illegally within the country.3 5 However, section 243(h) of the
INA36 authorized the Attorney General 7 to withhold deportation of
an alien already in the United States if it was determined that the
alien would be subject to persecution in his native land if deported. 8
Section 243(h)'s withholding of deportation constituted the exclusive
remedy for such an alien seeking refuge due to a fear of persecution
in his homeland.39 While the section does not actually confer asylum
on an alien, it has often been referred to by courts as an asylum
provision because it allows the alien to stay in the United States
AD. NEws, at 144, 160 [hereinafter cited as H. R. REP.].
34. See generally 8 C.F.R. § 208 (1983) (procedures relating to asylum applications by asylees). Asylees, persons requesting asylum after entering the country, are distinguished from refugees, persons outside the United States seeking political asylum in
America. However, because the Uiited Nations Protocol and the Refugee Act of 1980
apply the definition of a "refugee" to both groups of people, the distinction is unimportant for purposes of determining eligibility for asylum in light of the 1980 Act. Therefore, in this Comment, all persons requesting asylum are referred to as refugees. See 8
U.S.C. §§ 1157, 1158 (1982).
35. See Yan We Cheng v. Rinaldi, 389 F. Supp. 583 (D.N.J. 1975) (stating the
general rule that aliens unlawfully present in the United States have no right to asylum).
See also Note, The Right of Asylum Under United States Law, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
1125 (1980) (arguing that the United States government and the courts have failed to
recognize the existence of a right of asylum in qualified applicants). Recently, a federal
district court decision guaranteed illegal aliens the right to be apprised by the INS of
asylum procedures and of the right to counsel. Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F.
Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
36. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 163,
212 (1952) amended by the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965,
Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 11(f), 79 Stat. 918 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)
(1982)). Section 243(h) read:
The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any
alien. . .within the United States to any country in which in his opinion the
alien would be subject to persecution on account of race, religion, or political
opinion and for such period of time as he deems to be necessary for such reason.
The Refugee Act of 1980 removed the discretionary words "in his opinion" from section
243(h), replaced persecution with "life or freedom would be threatened," and added "nationality" and "membership of a particular social group" to "race, religion, or political
opinion." Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 203(e), 94 Stat. 102, 107 (amending § 243(h) of the
INA) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982)).
37. The Attorney General has delegated his exclusive authority over immigration
procedures to the INS, which is part of the U.S. Department of Justice. 8 C.F.R. § 100.2
(1983).
38. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. 82-414, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 214
(1952) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982)).
39. The Refugee Act of 1980 established separate proceedings permitting all aliens
within the United States to apply for asylum. Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 208, 94 Stat. 102,
105 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982)).
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40
rather than be deported to face persecution in his homeland.

The United Nations Protocol
In 1968, the United States became a party to the United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 41 (Protocol). The Protocol defines a "refugee" as a person who:
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted, for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who,
not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result 42
of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to return to it.

A separate provision of the Protocol prohibits a signatory state's
"refouler" (return) of a refugee to a territory where the refugee's
life or freedom would be threatened because of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 3
The language of the Protocol is in several ways more liberal than
the existing United States laws relating to refugees.4 4 First, the Protocol's definition of refugee includes refugees from any country in
the world. 5 Second, the Protocol eliminates the requirement that a
refugee have "fled" from the country of his nationality or habitual
residence. 6 Consequently, an alien is entitled to apply for asylum as
40. See, e.g., Rejaie v. INS, 691 F.2d 139, 140 (3d Cir. 1982) (the court of appeals refers to the alien's request for withholding of deportation under § 243(h) of the
INA as a petition for political asylum). But cf. In re Lam, I.D. No. 2857 (BIA 1981)
(making an important distinction between withholding of deportation and asylum in that
asylum will not be granted to an alien who has been firmly resettled in a third place,
whereas the concept of firm resettlement is not relevant to § 243(h) applications).
41. Opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter cited as Protocol]. The Protocol incorporates Articles 2 to 34,
inclusive, of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature
July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. The major difference between the Protocol and the
Convention is that the Protocol extended protection to persons who became refugees due
to world events after 1951. The United States was not a signatory to the 1951
Convention.
42. Protocol, supra note 41, art. 1, § 1, at 6261 (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 6276. Under certain circumstances, however, a refugee may be deported
to another country, since withholding of deportation is country-specific. Thus, if there is
any other place to which an alien may safely be deported, such deportation will be effected. See In re Lam, I.D. No. 2857 (BIA 1981) (the Board withheld deportation of the
alien to the People's Republic of China, but found him deportable to Hong Kong because
he had lived there for several years without any fear of persecution).
44. See Note, The Right of Asylum Under United States Immigration Law, 33 U.
FLA. L. REV. 539, 544 (1981).
45. C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 22, at § 2.24Ab.
46. Id.

a refugee whether his original purpose was to flee persecution or
whether events later made it impossible for the alien to return to his
former country. Third, the term "persecution" was defined as a
"threat to one's life or freedom, ' ' 47 whereas United States law defined it as "the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ
(in race, ' '4religion, or political opinion) in a way regarded as
offensive. 8
By ratifying the Protocol, the United States became obligated to
implement the provisions of the treaty.49 Nevertheless, Congress
made no effort to modify United States immigration laws to conform
to the Protocol. When the Senate gave its advise and consent for the
United States to become a party to the Protocol, it did so with the
understanding that accession did not require any changes in the existing immigration statutes.50 The INA appeared sufficiently compatible with the Protocol and flexible enough to accommodate any minor administrative alterations that would be necessary.51 The INS
confirmed the Senate's position in a 1973 decision of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (Board).52 The Board stated that accession to
the Protocol would not require radical changes in existing laws.5 3
The Protocol would merely lend the weight of the nation's moral
support to the document and would influence other nations with less
liberal refugee legislation to adhere to the Protocol as well. 5
In 1970, an embarrassing incident known as the Kudirka Affair
dramatized the need to reform asylum procedures.5 Kudirka was a
47. Protocol, supra note 41, art. -31, at 6275.
48. Moghanian v. United States Dep't of Justice, 577 F.2d 141, 142 (9th Cir.
1978) (quoting Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969)).
49. S. REP., supra note 1, at 4.
50. S. EXEc. Doc. K, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 7, 8 (1968); S. ExEc. REP. No. 14,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-10 (1968). See also Ming v. Marks, 367 F. Supp. 673, 677-79
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd per curiam, 505 F.2d 1170 (2d Cir. 1974) (citing the 1968 legislative history to support the belief that the Convention would not alter or enlarge the
effect of existing immigration laws because United States immigration laws already embodied the principles of the Convention).
51. S. EXEc. Doc. K, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 7, 8 (1968); S. ExEc. REP. No. 14,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-10 (1968).
52. In re Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310, 314 (1973). The Board is an appellate panel
with jurisdiction to hear appeals from decisions of INS special inquiry officers and immigration judges. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1 (1983). An alien may currently appeal a decision of the
Board to the United States courts of appeals. The pending Simpson-Mazzoli Bill proposes a United States Immigration Board empowered to hear all appeals in lieu of the
present Board. S. 529, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 124(a)(2), 129 CONG. REC. S6975 (daily
ed. May 18, 1983).
53. In re Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310, 313-14 (1973). In effect, the Board said the
treaty was not self-executing, and was not meant to supersede prior United States law.
Id. See Pierre v. United States, 547 F.2d 1281, 1288 (5th Cir. 1977) (the courts also
refused to acknowledge that the Protocol modified United States asylum law).
54. In re Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310, 314 (1973).
55. See O'Brian, The Kudirka Affair: Bringing Sanity to the Laws of Asylum,
HUM. RTs., Winter 1980, at 38-43, 56.
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Lithuanian sailor who jumped from his Soviet fishing boat to an
American Coast Guard ship while both vessels were in the territorial
waters of the United States. He requested immediate asylum in the
United States. His request was refused without an investigation of
the situation, and Kudirka was returned to his ship by Russian
sailors who beat him into submission.e
The publicity from the incident caused the State Department to
declare that the United Nations Protocol required all requests for
asylum to be seriously considered whether made abroad or in the
United States.5 However, asylum was made available to persons in
the United States only at the discretion of the State Department and
not because of any congressional directive.58 In 1974, the INS
promulgated new regulations allowing aliens physically present in
the country to apply directly to the INS for asylum.59 These regulations, however, were insufficient to meet the growing demand for refugee resettlement in the United States by large numbers of refugees
fleeing Indochina, Cuba, Haiti, and other nations with oppressive
governments.6 0 A refugee policy was needed that would "treat all
refugees fairly and assist all refugees equally."8 1
The 1980 Refugee Act
The Refugee Act of 1980 established, for the first time, a comprehensive United States refugee admission and resettlement policy in
response to the rapid increase in the number of refugees worldwide. 2 The new Act required the Attorney General to establish a
uniform procedure for determining the eligibility of an asylum applicant." Refugees from any country would now be eligible to apply for
asylum." Additionally, a separate provision allowed aliens already
56. Id.
57. General Policy Statement, 66 DEP'T STATE BULL. 124 (1972); see also 37 Fed.
Reg. 3447 (1972) (in which the INS adopted the policy set out by the State Department); but see Kan Kam Lin v. Rinaldi, 361 F. Supp. 177 (D.N.J. 1973), affd, 493 F.2d
1229 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1975) (only aliens lawfully in the
United States are protected by the provisions of the Protocol).
58. General Policy Statement, 66 DEP'T STATE BULL. 124 (1972).
59. 39 Fed. Reg. 41,832 (1974) (r.epealed in 1981 because it was superseded by
the Refugee Act of 1980).
60. S. REP., supra note 1, at 4.
61. Id. at 2 (remarks of Senator Kennedy).

62.

Id. at 1. See supra note 9.

63.

Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(b), 94 Stat. 102, 103 (adding

64.

Id. (adding § 207(a)(1) to the INA) (currently codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)

§ 208(a) to the INA) (currently codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982)).
(1982)).

present in the United States to apply for asylum. 5 Even asylum requests made during deportation and exclusion proceedings were to be
seriously considered.6 6
Another main purpose of the Refugee Act of 1980 was to conform
United States law with its treaty obligations under the Protocol, despite earlier assurances that statutory changes were not necessary to
comply with the Protocol.6 7 To accomplish this objective, Congress
adopted the internationally accepted definition of "refugee" contained in the Protocol."" The addition of the refugee definition was a
significant reform in the United States immigration law. Under this
definition, an alien must be either unable or unwilling to return to
his country because of a "well-founded fear" of persecution. 9 The
Refugee Act authorizes the Attorney General to grant
asylum to any
'7 0
alien who meets the new definition of "refugee.
Because the INS and the courts have espoused different interpretations of the new "well-founded fear" standard set forth in the "refugee" definition, the purpose of the Refugee Act has arguably been
thwarted.71 To conform United States law to the Protocol and to
establish uniform asylum procedures, a single standard for determining eligibility for asylum must be adopted.
65. Id. (adding § 208(a) to the INA) (currently codified at 8 U.S.C.§ 1158(a)
(1982)).
66. 8 C.F.R. § 208.10 (1983). Under former law, only deportable aliens were entitled to section 243(h) relief and the protection of the Protocol.
67. S. REP., supra note 1, at 4. See also Stevic v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401, 407 (2d Cir.
1982), cert.granted,51 U.S.L.W. 3633 (U.S. Feb. 28, 1983) (No. 82-973) (concludes
that the 1980 revisions accomplish what had not been done when the United States acceded to the Protocol in 1968).
68. Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(a)(42), 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (adding § 101(a)(42)
to the INA) (currently codified at 8 U.S.C. § 110 1(a)(42) (1982)). The section states:
The term "refugee" means (A) any person who is outside any country of such
person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside
any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of
the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion .
This definition replaces the restrictive eligibility requirements of § 203(a)(7) of the INA.
69. Id.
70. Id. at § 201(b) (adding § 208(a) to the INA) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a),
(b) (1982)). Upon proving eligibility, the alien is granted conditional asylum for one
year, at which time permanent residence status is conferred if the alien's situation is
unchanged and the annual quota of 5,000 persons allows adjustment of status. See 8
C.F.R. § 208.8 (1983); 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (1982). Asylum itself is within the discretion
of the Attorney General, although it is questionable whether the Protocol allows this
discretion. See

UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER OF REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON

(1979); see also Note,
supra note 35, at 1138.
71. See Petition f6r a Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, at 11-13, Marroquin-Manriquez v. INS, 699 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1983),
petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3759 (U.S. April 7, 1983) (No. 82-1649) [hereinafPROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS

ter cited as Petition for Writ] (on file with the San Diego Law Review).
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THE TRADITIONAL STANDARDS OF PROOF

Section 243(h)'s "Clear Probabilityof Persecution" Standard
The INA and corresponding INS regulations specifically place the
72
burden of proving a claim for asylum on the asylum applicat.
Before the Refugee Act of 1980, section 243(h) required an applicant to show that he "would be" subject to persecution because of
race, religion, or political opinion.7 The Board and most of the federal courts interpreted "would be" to require a showing of a "clear
probability" of persecution directed at the individual applicant."4
This stringent standard has been defined as a slightly higher standard than a fear of being shot. 5 It developed from the concept that
an alien did not have a right to asylum under section 243(h); therefore, the Attorney General could exercise discretion and restrict relief to those who would "clearly" be subject to persecution. 76
While a majority of courts have followed the standard set by the
Board, a few courts have developed a different standard for asylum
applications. At least one federal court has applied a lesser "preponderance of the evidence" standard to section 243(h) claims," and
several courts have occasionally required close to absolute proof of
the alien's pending persecution. 8 One United States court of appeals
72. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.5, 242.17(c) (1983); see also Martineau v. INS, 556 F.2d
306, 307 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating that the rule is well established that an alien has the
burden of proving that deportation will lead to persecution).
73. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 163,
212 (1952) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982)).
74. See Kashani v. INS, 547 F.2d 376, 379 (7th Cir. 1977); Rosa v. INS, 440
F.2d 100, 102 (1st Cir. 1971); Cheng Kai Fu v. INS, 386 F.2d 750, 753 (2d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1003 (1968); In re Ramirez-Romero, I.D. No. 2884 (BIA 1981);
In re Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310 (1973). See also In re Joseph, 13 I. & N. Dec. 70, 72
(1968) (in which the Board noted that it would restrict section 243(h) relief to cases in
which there was a "clear probability" of future persecution. The Board was exercising
interpretative discretion; it did not claim that Congress had such a standard in mind
when it drafted the statutory language "would be subject to persecution").
75. Miller, How to Immigrate: Better Find a Relative Who's Already Here, L.A.
Daily J., July 8, 1983, at 4, col. 3.
76. In re Joseph, 13 I. & N. Dec. 70, 72 (1968); see also Lena v. INS, 379 F.2d
536, 538 (7th Cir. 1967) (although the Attorney General restricts favorable exercise of
discretion to cases of a clear probability of persecution, he has not exercised his discretion in an arbitrary manner); Yan Wo Cheng v. Rinaldi, 389 F. Supp. 583, 585 (D.N.J.
1975) (aliens in the United States unlawfully have no right to asylum).
77. See Henry v. INS, 552 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1977); Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d 194
(5th Cir. 1975); Daniel v. INS, 528 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1976).
78. See Marroquin-Manriquez v. INS, 699 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1983), petition for
cert.filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3759 (U.S. April 7, 1983) (No. 82-1649) (despite six volumes of
documentary evidence, expert testimony, and testimony of the alien's family, asylum and
section 243(h) relief were denied); Fleurinor v. INS, 585 F.2d 129, 134 (5th Cir. 1978)

has actually employed three different standards.79 Regardless of the
standard employed, or the terminology used by the court, the result
is usually the same - the alien is unable to meet the burden of
proving eligibility for asylum. 0
In practice, the "clear probability" standard means that an alien
must produce a certain type of evidence, and produce a sufficient
amount of it, to convince the Board of the credibility of the asylum
application.81 Specifically, the Board requires the alien to present objective evidence 2 that he would be singled out for persecution 3 by
the government or in some cases by a powerful political group in the
alien's native country. 4 Unlike most judicial proceedings, in asylum
proceedings the alien's own unsubstantiated testimony and that of
friends is generally not sufficient.8 5 Additionally, newspaper articles
(despite proof of past persecution, the court stated that further proof of future persecution was needed); Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1968) (despite unimpeached
documentary and expert testimony, section 243(h) relief was denied).
79. See the following decisions of the Fifth Circuit: Fleurinor v. INS, 585 F.2d 129
(5th Cir. 1978) (applying a standard which requires almost absolute proof of persecution); Martineau v. INS, 556 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1977) (applying the "clear probability"
test); Daniel v. INS, 528 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1976) (adopting the "preponderance of
evidence" test).
80. See generally Petition for Writ, supra note 71, at 11-16 ("clear probability"
test as applied by the Third Circuit in Marroquin is a burden nearly impossible to meet
and deprives many deserving refugees of relief).
81. This interpretation of the "clear probability" standard is followed by the INS
in asylum cases. See infra notes 90-91, and accompanying text. However, the statute
does not restrict or specify the considerations that may be relied upon by the Attorney
General in determining that an alien would be subject to persecution. See 8 U.S.C. §
1253(h) (1982).
82. See Moghanian v. United States Dep't of Justice, 577 F.2d 141, 142 (9th Cir.
1978) (undocumented claim that an alien, a member of a religious minority in Iran,
would be persecuted is insufficient); Kashani v. INS, 547 F.2d 376, 379 (7th Cir. 1977)
(objective evidence that an alien will be persecuted is necessary); Khalil v. District Director of the INS, 457 F.2d 1276, 1278 (9th Cir. 1972) (statements without factual support
cannot sustain the alien's burden of proof); Rosa v. INS, 440 F.2d 100, 102 (1st Cir.
1971) (the clear probability standard requires more than unsubstantiated assertions);
Gena v.INS, 424 F.2d 227, 232 (5th Cir. 1970) (an alien's failure to obtain affidavits or
other evidence precludes the alien's claim); In re Dunar, 14 1. & N. Dec. 310, 319
(1973) (some sort of a showing must be made and this can ordinarily be done only by
objective evidence).
83. See Shoaee v. INS, 704 F.2d 1079, 1084 (9th Cir. 1983) (proof that the alien's
family was closely connected with the Shah's regime in Iran and that the alien's father
and brother had been persecuted was insufficient); Fleurinor v. INS. 585 F.2d 129, 13334 (5th Cir. 1978) (an Amnesty International Report does not add to the claim that an
alien will be subject to persecution upon return to his native country of Haiti); Zamora v.
INS, 534 F.2d 1055, 1063 (2d Cir. 1976) (concluding that although the alien's father
had been an officer in the army of the president overthrown by Duvalier in Haiti and the
alien's step-mother was the sister of the former president, the evidence was insufficient to
prove that the alien was subject to personal threats of persecution).
84. Rosa v. INS, 440 F.2d 100, 102 (1st Cir. 1971). The Board generally requires
that the government be the persecuting agent; however, in several cases the Board has
considered claims of persecution by "a strong minority [with] de facto political power."
Id.
85. In re Martinez-Romero, I.D. No. 2872 (BIA 1981); In re Chumpitazi, 16 I. &
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and other evidence of general conditions in the country indicating
widespread persecution are not considered probative, even if such evidence relates to the applicant's particular religious, social, or political group.86 Even evidence of past persecution is not in itself sufficient unless the alien can show the government's motive for
persecuting him still exists.8a The result of the Board's harsh "clear
probability" standard and strict evidentiary requirements is that few
aliens are granted relief from deportation, regardless of the likelihood of their persecution.
Section 203(a)(7)'s "Good Reason to Fear Persecution" Standard

In contrast, section 203(a)(7) of the INA, added in 1965, made
asylum available to an alien who could demonstrate that he was una-

ble or unwilling to return to his native country due to "persecution
or fear of persecution." 88 This language was almost identical to the
definition of "refugee" adopted a few years later by the Protocol. To
prove asylum under section 203(a)(7), the Board required an appli-

cant to demonstrate a "good reason" to fear persecution.8 9 The

N. Dec. 629 (1978). In most civil and criminal proceedings, the credibility of a person's
testimony is a question for the judge or jury to decide. Ballou v. United States, 370 F.2d
659, 664 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967) (the manner and demeanor
of the witnesses were relevant factors to be considered by the jury in determining the
weight to be accorded to the testimony given). See United States v. Copeland, 263 F.
Supp. 976, 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (in determining credibility, the trier of fact should consider the witness's appearance, manner, demeanor, frankness, and capacity to relate accurately, as well as the contents of the testimony).
86. In re Diaz, 10 I. & N. Dec. 199, 200 (1963); Ishak v. INS, 432 F. Supp. 624
(N.D. Ill. 1977); cf. Coriolan v. INS, 559 F.2d 993, 1004 (5th Cir. 1977) (the INS could
not properly decide an alien's fate without taking note of conditions in the alien's country); Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 475 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (in
reviewing the claims of Haitians, the court stated that no asylum claim can be examined
without an understanding of the conditions in the applicant's homeland).
87. See Fleurinor v. INS, 585 F.2d 129, 134 (5th Cir. 1978) (requiring that the
claimant present evidence that the Haitian government remembers him despite having
been beaten, robbed, and jailed eight years earlier).
88. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, §
203(a)(7), 79 Stat. 911, 912-15 (amending the INA) (repealed 1980). Section 203(a)(7)
read:
Conditional entries shall next be made available by the Attorney General ...
to aliens who satisfy an . . . officer (A) that (i) because of persecution or fear
of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion they have fled (I)
from any Communist or Communist-dominated country or area, or (II) any
country within the general area of the Middle East, and (ii) are unable or unwilling to return to such country or area on account of race, religion, or political
opinion...
(Emphasis added).
89. See In re Ugricic, 14 I. & N. Dec. 384 (1972); In re Adamska, 12 I. & N.

Board admitted on several occasions that the "good reason" test was
less stringent than the "clear probability" test of section 243(h), although both sections were intended to aid aliens fleeing persecution
in their homeland. 90 Several aliens made attempts to convince the
Board that United States ratification of the Protocol in 1968 mandated the eligibility requirements of section 243(h) to conform to the
more lenient "good reason to fear" standard of section 203(a)(7) because it more closely followed the Protocol's definition of a "refugee." ' Yet the Board specifically rejected the contention that the
same standard of proof was required for both sections of the Act,
despite the legislative history of the 1965 amendments to the INA
which approved a single standard of proof for both sections.9 2
THE EFFECT OF THE 1980 REFUGEE ACT ON THE ASYLUM
STANDARD OF PROOF

Stevic v. Sava

With passage of the 1980 Act, Congress expressed its intent to
align United States asylum law with the Protocol, 93 and admitted
that more than "minor administrative alterations" were necessary.
The "well-founded fear" requirement of the Protocol's definition of
"refugee" was adopted as the uniform standard of proof for all applicants under the new Act.94 Both asylum and withholding of deportation provisions, now based directly on the language of the Protocol,
were intended to be construed consistent with the meaning of the
Protocol.9 5
Stevic v. Sava"6 was the first case to directly address the effect of
Dec. 201 (1967).
90. In re Tan, 12 I. & N. Dec. 564, 569-70 (1967); In re Janus & Janek, 12 I. &
N. Dec. 866, 876 (1968).
91. In re Tan, 12 I. & N. Dec. 564, 568-70 (1967); In re Janus & Janek, 12 I. &
N. Dec. 866, 876 (1968).
92. 111 CONG. REC. H21,804 (1965) (remarks of Rep. Poff comparing the burden
of proof of § 203(a)(7) to that of amended § 243(h): "[A]n alien who seeks to enter this
country as a refugee must prove that he is a victim of persecution on account of one of
three things, race, religion, or political opinion. My amendment simply requires that the
alien who is about to be deported from this country must bear the same burden of proof
if he is to be spared the penalty of deportation and retained in this country.")
93. S. REP., supra note 1, at 4.
94. Id. at 9, 16. See Stevic v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401, 408 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3633 (U.S. Feb. 28, 1983) (No. 82-973).
95. See H. R. REP., supra note 33, at 20. In In re Lam, I.D. No. 2857 (BIA
1981), the Board held that "where a finding has been made that an alien's life or freedom would be threatened in a given country, and that his deportation to that country
should thus be withheld, then it should also be found that the alien has a well-founded
fear of persecution in that country for asylum purposes." Id. at 5. However, the Board
distinguished a grant of asylum from a stay of deportation under section 243(h) because
asylum additionally requires that the alien has not "firmly resettled" himself in another
country. Id. at 5.
96. 678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3633 (U.S. Feb. 28,
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the Refugee Act's "well-founded fear" test on the alien's burden of
proof. The Board had denied Stevic the opportunity to reopen his
deportation proceedings to apply for withholding (pursuant to section
243(h)), because he failed to demonstrate "a clear probability" of
persecution. The Second Circuit held that the Protocol's more liberal
"well-founded fear" standard made the Board's "clear probability"
standard no longer applicable.97 After an exhaustive analysis of the
Act's legislative history, the court concluded that "asylum may be
granted and, under section 243(h), deportation must be withheld,
upon a showing far short of a 'clear probability' that an individual
will be singled out for persecution." 9 8 The court remanded the case
for a full hearing under the more lenient standard of proof established by the Protocol, and codified in the 1980 Refugee Act. Although the Stevic court discussed the elements an alien must prove
to be granted asylum-that the alien have a fear of persecution, and
that the fear be well-founded-it purposely did not focus on the
character of evidence that would be needed to satisfy the elements of
the new standard.9 9
The Conflict Between the Circuits Over the Appropriate Standard
Five months later, the Third Circuit, faced with the same issue,
concluded that Stevic was wrongly decided. In Rejaie v. INS,10 0 the
court agreed with the government's position in Stevic that the terms
"clear probability" and "well-founded fear" were identical."0 ' Under
either test, according to the Rejaie court, the alien must present
"some objective evidence establishing a realistic likelihood that he
1983) (No. 82-973). Other cases have examined the "clear probability" test in light of
the language of the Protocol. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. See also
INS v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62, 79 n.22 (1969) (the Supreme Court noted that it was

premature at that time to consider whether, and under what circumstances, a deportation
order would contravene the Protocol). Although the test has been questioned before,

Stevic was the first case to address the issue of the alien's burden of proof since the
provisions of the Protocol were codified into United States law.
97. 678 F.2d at 408. The Stevic court rejected the Board's conclusion in In re

Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310, 319-21 (1973), that the "clear probability" test was the
same as the "well-founded fear" test. 678 F.2d at 406. The Stevic court found that the

"well-founded fear" test more closely resembled the "good reason to fear" test of former

section 203(a)(7). Since the Refugee Act eliminated the distinction between aliens seeking to enter as refugees under the old section 203(a)(7) and deportable aliens already in
the country seeking political asylum under section 243(h), a uniform standard of proof
should be applied in both situations. 678 F.2d. at 408.
98. 678 F.2d at 409.
99. Id.
100. 691 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1982).
101. Id. at 146.

would be persecuted in his native land.

10 2

The Rejaie court relied on pre-1980 case law to determine that
the two standards were equivalent because both required more than
a subjective or conjectural fear of persecution. 0 3 The court also
quoted the legislative history of the Refugee Act to show that the
modification of section 243(h) was merely a procedural change, not
a substantive one.1 04 The Third Circuit concluded that the Refugee
Act did not modify the legal test applicable to section 243(h) because the INS had already been applying the legal test mandated by
the Protocol.10 5 Furthermore, the INS insisted that the Board and
the courts have consistently applied the objective "clear probability"
test even though the test has been described by a variety of terminology, including "probability of persecution," "likelihood of persecution," "reason to fear persecution," and "well-founded fear of
persecution." 106
One of the criticisms the Rejaie court had of the Stevic decision
was that the Second Circuit had attributed a stringency to the "clear
probability" test which was not consistent with prior cases. Stevic,
however, did not reject the requirement that the alien produce some
evidence of a threat of persecution. Rather, it distinguished the
Board's strict objective test used (with regard to deportable aliens)
in section 243(h) cases from the more lenient "good reason to fear"
test applied by the Board when considering admission of refugees
under section 203(a)(7), 07 a distinction which the Board itself had
recognized prior to the 1980 Act.10 8 While the Second Circuit in
102. Id. at 144.
103. See Kashani v. INS, 547 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1977); see also In re Dunar, 14
1. & N. Dec. 310, 319 (1973), in which the Board stated:
Some sort of showing must be made and this can ordinarily be done only by
objective evidence. The claimant's own testimony as to the facts will sometimes
be all that is available; but the crucial question is whether the testimony, if
accepted as true, makes out a realistic likelihood that he will be persecuted. The
burden of coming forward with the requisite evidence is obviously the claimant's. And, if all he can show is that there is a merely conjectural possibility of
persecution, his fear can hardly be characterized as 'well-founded.'
104. 691 F.2d at 144, 146. See also S. REP., supra note 1, at 9; H.R. REP., supra
note 33, at 18, (states that the new asylum provisions clarify the procedure for determining claims filed by aliens physically present in the United States. The subjective standard
did not change. However, until 1980 Congress had never indicated what the appropriate
standard is under the Protocol. The INS developed the "clear probability" standard and
the federal courts of appeals deferred to the agency's expertise and discretion).
105. 691 F.2d at 146-47.
106. Petition for Writ, supra 'note 71, at 16.
107. 678 F.2d at 405-06.
108. See In re Joseph, 13 I. & N. Dec. 70, 72 (1968); In re Tan, 12 1. & N. Dec.
564, 568-69 (1967). INS Operating Instruction 208.4, issued November 11, 1981, copies
the "good reason" language:
The burden is on the asylum applicant to establish that he/she is unable or
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of
the protection of the country of such person's nationality. . . because of perse-
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Stevic emphasized the elements an alien must prove to obtain asylum, the Third Circuit focused on the type of evidence required. According to the Rejaie court, only objective evidence of persecution,
as opposed to undocumented fears, would satisfy the alien's burden
of proving eligibility for asylum. 10 9
A classic example of the application of the stringent "clear
probability" test is illustrated by the Third Circuit's decision in
Marroquin-Manriquez v. INS.110 In Marroquin, the court denied
the alien's request for asylum and application for withholding of deportation because he had not presented evidence showing a "clear
probability" of persecution if he were returned to Mexico, his native
country. The Third Circuit also affirmed its recent decision in
Rejaie, that the "clear probability" of persecution standard is identical to the new "well-founded fear" standard, and therefore the
Board did not err in its use of the "clear probability" standard.,"
Marroquin, a Marxist student revolutionary, had been involved in
peaceful campus demonstrations until a local newspaper falsely accused him of assassinating a fellow student activist. Upon an attorney's recommendation, Marroquin fled the country, eventually entering the United States illegally, where he worked under an assumed
name. While in the United States he learned that Mexican authorities continued to arrest and torture student activists, and that he had
of participating in an armed guerrilla assault and
been accused
112
robbery.
At his deportation hearing, Marroquin testified that a Mexican
attorney told him he would never receive a fair trial in Mexico and
that he should stay out of the country. His fear of persecution was
corroborated by his wife's testimony, six volumes of documentary evidence, and the testimony of three expert witnesses.111 Despite Marroquin's overwhelming amount of convincing evidence," 4 the court
cution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. This means

that the applicant must have actually been persecuted, or can show good reason
why he/she fears persecution.
(Emphasis added).
109. 691 F.2d at 145-46.
110.

699 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1983), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3759 (U.S.

April 7, 1983) (No. 82-1649).
111. Id. at 133.
112.

Id. at 130-31.

113. Id. at 131-32.
114. Very few aliens have documentary evidence or expert testimony to corroborate their testimony. Marroquin produced substantially more evidence than most aliens.
See In re A-, reported at 60 INTERPRETER RELEASES 25, 27 (1983).

affirmed the Board's ruling that "the record as a whole did not sustain the claim that Marroquin himself would be persecuted upon his
return to Mexico." ' It noted that the Board had denied relief because it found no "compelling reason to believe that Marroquin
would not receive a fair trial in Mexico" and because one expert
witness was unable to state "conclusively" that Marroquin would be
persecuted if deported.1 16 Such an application of the "clear
probability" test reveals it to be far more stringent than the "wellfounded fear" test adopted by the 1980 Act. Instead of focusing on
the alien's fear of persecution, the "clear probability" test requires
almost absolute proof of future persecution - a burden practically

impossible to meet before persecution has actually occurred.'
Defining the Well-Founded Fear of Persecution Test
Not only does the "clear probability" test approach a degree of
certainty which makes it nearly impossible to satisfy, but it totally
ignores the subjective component of the analysis emphasized by the
United Nations Committee which drafted the Protocol. According to
the United Nations Committee, the expression "well-founded fear"
of being persecuted means either that a person has actually been a
victim of persecution or "can show good reason why he fears
persecution.""'

In 1979, the United Nations published its interpretation of the
Protocol in its Handbook on Proceduresand Criteriafor Determining Refugee Status.1 The Handbook, an accumulation of twentyfive years of experience and research, was published as a guideline
for Contracting States to aid in administering the Protocol. Since the
United States is a contracting party to the Protocol, and has ex-

pressed its intent to follow its provisions, the Handbook should be
used in conjunction with the 1980 Act to formulate specific procedures regarding the admission of refugees. The Handbook states
115. 699 F.2d at 132.
116. Id. at 133-34. See also Petition for Writ, supra note 71, at 16 (quoting from
Reyes v. INS, 693 F.2d 597, 600 (6th Cir. 1982): "In light of the powerful showing that
was made below, it is 'difficult to see what more than what was offered here [could be]
require[d] short of proof of actual persecution after the fact.' ").
117. Petition for Writ, supra note 71, at 16. See also Reyes v. INS, 693 F.2d 597,
600 (6th Cir. 1982).
118. United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems 11, U.N. Doc. E/1618; E/AC 32/5
(1950) (emphasis added).
119. Published by the OFFICE OF THE-UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
REFUGEES (1979) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK]. Because the HANDBOOK was not
published until shortly before final passage of the Refugee Act, no mention of the HANDBOOK is made in the legislative history. However, the Board has treated the HANDBOOK
as a significant source of guidance as to the meaning of the Protocol. In re RodriguezPalma, 17 I. & N. Dec. 465 (1980).
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that a "well-founded fear of being persecuted" involves subjective as
well as objective elements. 120
These elements may be proved by various types of evidence. The
subjective element requires the court to evaluate the alien's statements,1 21 his personality,' 22 and his opinions and feelings 123 to determine whether the alien's fear is reasonable under the circumstances.
Occasionally, an alien may have been subject to various circumstances, none in themselves amounting to persecution, but which
have a cumulative effect on the applicant's mind which creates a
well-founded fear of persecution. 24 A valid claim to refugee status
may be justified on the "cumulative grounds" theory even though no
specific evidence shows that the applicant "would be" subject to persecution if deported. 2 5
The objective element necessitates an evaluation of the applicant's
credibility. 126 Such an evaluation can be accomplished by producing
evidence to prove that the alien's fear is well-founded. Relevant evidence includes statements of the applicant's own personal experiences, as well as the experiences of friends, relatives, and "other
members of the same racial or social group."' 27 The laws of the
country of origin are also probative, "particularly the manner in
which they are applied."' 2s Finally, evidence of general conditions in
the alien's native country are important. Although such evidence
alone will not support a grant of asylum, a knowledge of these conditions is necessary to assess the alien's credibility. 129
The sufficiency of evidence under the "well-founded fear" standard is also less demanding than under the "clear probability" stan120. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES,
HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS § 38
(1979). Both the government and the courts agreed that the correct standard requires a
rational fear and not merely a subjective evaluation. See Petition for Rehearing, supra
note 18, at 8, 12, in which the INS uses the language of section 37 of the HANDBOOK to
equate a "well-founded fear" with a "clear probability" of persecution.
121. HANDBOOK, supra note 119, at § 37.
122. Id. at § 40.
123. Id. at § 52.
124. Id. at § 53.
125. Id.
126. Id. at § 42.

127.

Id. at § 43. The "clear probability" standard does not consider experiences of

third persons to be probative of the individual's likelihood of persecution. Shoaee v. INS,

704 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1983).
HANDBOOK, supra note 119, at § 43.
129. Id. at §§ 37, 42, 98. Examples of conditions include a state of war or civil war
in the country, as well as activities by political terrorists or secret police which make the
country unsafe for the asylum applicant. Id.

128.

dard. Under the "well-founded fear" test the lack of outside evidence
need not defeat an asylum claim. In most cases a person fleeing from
persecution will have arrived with only the barest necessities and
very frequently without documents to prove his statements. 130 In
such cases, if the applicant's account appears credible, he should be
given the benefit of the doubt unless there are good reasons to the
contrary, or the alien's statements are inconsistent with generally
known facts?"3' False statements are not necessarily a reason for refusal of refugee status. 132 "A person who, because of his experiences,
was in fear of the authorities in his own country may still feel apprehensive [of] any authority [and] may therefore be afraid to speak
freely and give a full and accurate account" of past persecution. 33
"It may be necessary for the examiner to clarify any apparent inconsistencies and to resolve any contradictions" through personal interviews with the applicant.1 34
Although the burden of proof rests on the alien, the examiner has
the burden of eliciting and clarifying information relating to the
13 5
alien's situation as well as the burden of researching the case.
When all available evidence has been obtained and checked, the examiner must decide the case solely on the criteria set forth above,
unclouded by personal or political considerations. 3 6 If the court finds
that the alien has good reason to fear persecution, asylum should be
granted.
The Need for Uniform Application of the "Well-Founded Fear"
Standard
Although the Handbook defines the "well-founded fear" test in
detail, the INS and the federal courts of appeals have not applied
the test uniformly. On the contrary, the reaction of the courts to
Stevic has been mixed. Confusion over the proper standard of proof
and its evidentiary requirements is apparent in recent decisions.
At least one other court of appeals has followed Stevic and held
that "the 'clear probability' test is inconsistent
with the tenor and
137
spirit, if not the language" of the 1980 Act.
130. Id. at § 196.
131. Id. at § 204.
132. Id. at § 199.
133. Id. at § 198.
134. Id. at § 199. The examiner may be a special examiner from the INS, or an
immigration judge if an asylum request is made during deportation proceedings. 8
C.F.R. §§ 208.3, 208.6 (1983).
135. HANDBOOK, supra note 119, at § 196.
136. Id. at §§ 204, 205.
137. Reyes v. INS, 693 F.2d 597, 599 (6th Cir. 1982). The Ninth Circuit also
arguably adopted the reasoning of the Stevic court in McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312
(9th Cir. 1981), decided several months before Stevic. See also Almirol v. INS, 550 F.
Supp. 253 (N.D. Cal. 1982), (the district court rejected the "clear probability" standard
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The Sixth Circuit, in Reyes v. INS, agreed that a more lenient
standard of proof is now required, but failed to indicate the quantum
of proof now sufficient to satisfy the "well-founded fear" test.138 The
court, however, impliedly rejected the traditional rule that unsubstantiated testimony is insufficient to support a claim under section
243(h). 139
The reaction of the Board reflects the confusion among the federal
courts of appeals. At least two decisions of the Board have adhered
to the strict "clear probability" standard requiring evidence that the
aliens would face persecution if deported.1 40 In both cases, asylum

was denied. Another case quoted the Refugee Act's definition of
"refugee" but followed the holding of the Third Circuit in Rejaie,
holding that the new definition was identical to the old "clear
probability" standard.
In three other cases, the Board was undecided on the appropriate
standard for asylum eligibility.14 2 Acknowledging that the Second

Circuit had rejected the "clear probability" standard in Stevic, the
Board nevertheless found that the aliens' claims were meritless under
either the "clear probability," "well-founded fear," "good reason,"
or "realistic likelihood" standards of proof.
However, two recent decisions by immigration judges have followed the Handbook's recommendation in evaluating the aliens' requests for asylum. In a radical departure from traditional evidentiary requirements, an immigration judge granted both asylum and
withholding of deportation solely on the strength of the applicant's
own testimony.' 43 The judge quoted the Handbook to support the
contention that while objective evidence is preferable, the final deterin favor of the "well-founded fear" standard as contained in the INA's definition of
"refugee").
138. Reyes v. INS, 693 F.2d 597, 600 (6th Cir. 1982).
139. Id. The alien in Reyes, a native of the Philippines, offered only two documents, letters which described the physical persecution of others and advised her not to
return, to support her fear of persecution. Id. at 599. The court apparently viewed the
alien's testimony as credible because it could not see "what more than was offered here
* * .short of proof of actual persecution" would be necessary. Id. at 600. Instead of
remanding the case for reconsideration under the less stringent standard, the court reversed the judgment and granted the alien's request for asylum.
140.

1982).
141.

In re Exilus, I.D. No. 2914 (BIA 1982); In re Portales, I.D. No. 2905 (BIA

In re Sibrun, I.D. No. 2932 (BIA 1983).

142. Shoaee v. INS, 704 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Matelot, I.D. No. 2927
(BIA 1982); In re Phelisna, I.D. No. 2913 (BIA 1982), rev'd, 551 F. Supp. 960

(E.D.N.Y. 1982).
143. In re A-, reported at 60

INTERPRETER RELEASES

25, 26-29 (1983).

mination must be based on the credibility of the alien's testimony;
and if credible, whether the testimony constitutes a basis for finding
that the alien has a "well-founded fear" of persecution. 1 " The judge
concluded that the alien's past associations with the Somoza Regime
in Nicaragua, considered with the general political climate in that
country today, satisfied the "cumulative grounds"
theory on which a
1 45
claim of fear of persecution may be based.
In another decision, 46 the immigration judge granted asylum and
withholding of deportation on the basis of personal observations of
the applicant, evaluation of her testimony and that of her witnesses,
and newspaper articles, letters, and affidavits submitted by the alien.
Despite an opinion from the State Department 4 recommending denial of the alien's claim, the judge was satisfied that the alien had
testified truthfully and had a reasonable, well-founded fear of
persecution.148
These decisions, while recognizing the effect of the 1980 Act, indicate the need for a uniform standard of proof for aliens seeking political asylum in the United States. The "well-founded fear" of persecution standard should be adopted as set forth in the statutory
definition of "refugee"' 1 9 and defined by the United Nations in its
Handbook. 50 Under this standard, the alien must prove that he has
a "fear of persecution" and that his fear is "well-founded."' 5' Both
objective and subjective evidence may be used to prove the elements
of the "well-founded fear" standard. 52 Additionally, the sufficiency
of the evidence is to be determined on a case-by-case basis, depending on the credibility of the alien's story. 53 Once an alien establishes
a prima facie case under the "well-founded fear" standard, asylum
should be granted.

144. Id.
145. See HANDBOOK, supra note 119, at § 53.
146. In re -, reported at 60 INTERPRETER RELEASES 106 (1983).
147. The Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (BHRHA), at the
State Department, is required to issue recommendations on whether an applicant's claim
should be granted or denied. 8 C.F.R. § 208.7 (1983). These opinions are based on the
BHRHA's knowledge of the alien's native country. The BHRHA's opinions are routinely
followed by the INS officers when processing asylum applications. Immigration judges,
on the other hand, are more reluctant to blindly follow the recommendations, preferring
to make independent evaluations of the aliens' applications. See supra note 15.
148. In re -, reported at 60 INTERPRETER RELEASES 106 (1983).
149. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982).
150. HANDBOOK, supra note 119; see supra note 120 and accompanying text.
151. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982).
152. HANDBOOK, supra note 119, at §§ 38-43.
153. Id. at § 44.
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CONCLUSION

By enacting the Refugee Act of 1980, Congress intended to conform existing law to the Protocol and to establish a more uniform
procedure for the admission of refugees. 5 Since Congress adopted
the Protocol's definition of "refugee," it is arguably obligated to follow the guidelines set forth in the Handbook for implementing the
"well-founded fear" standard. These guidelines differ in many ways
from the guidelines and procedures followed by the INS. 15 Therefore, the currently used standard(s) of proof must be conformed to
the standard mandated by the Protocol and the Handbook. Several
possible solutions exist.
First, Congress could amend the Refugee Act of 1980 to include a
statutory standard of proof for granting asylum. Based on the Handbook's interpretation of the Protocol,1 the
appropriate test would be a
"good reason to fear persecution. 56 Once the test is explicitly
adopted by Congress, regulatory guidelines which parallel the recommendations of the Handbook should be promulgated. Such legislation would ensure nationwide uniformity in applying the standard.
Furthermore, it would clarify Congress' intent to modify former laws
relating to asylum.
A second and more feasible solution would be for the INS to promulgate new regulations which follow the Handbook's definition of a
"well-founded fear" of persecution. Arguably, Congress has already
provided a standard of proof for asylum by codifying the Protocol's
definition of a "refugee," which requires an alien to show a "wellfounded fear" of persecution. 57 Although new regulations were enacted after the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, much of the
language relating to the alien's burden of proof has remained unchanged or ambiguous. 58 Since the INS is required to issue regulations which conform to the laws enacted by Congress, 59 new regulations should be promulgated which implement the new "refugee"
154. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 119-34.
156. HANDBOOK, supra note 119, at § 45.
157. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201, 94 Stat. 102, 102 (adding §
101(a)(42) to the INA) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982)).
158. See 8 C.F.R. § 208 (1983) (quoting the language of the "refugee" definition
without explanation of what the provision requires); 8 C.F.R. § 242.17 (1983) (requiring
the alien to show that he would be subject to persecution).

159. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1982) (requires the Attorney General to establish such
regulations as he deems necessary for carrying out the provisions of the INA); see 8
C.F.R. § 100.6 (1983) (INS adoption of the congressional mandate).

definition. These regulations should follow the requirements of the
Handbook, equating a "well-founded fear" of persecution with a
"good reason to fear" persecution. By defining the specific requirements of the test as set forth above, the current practice of applying
various standards will be eliminated.
Finally, the Supreme Court may provide a resolution to the controversy over the issue of the appropriate standard of proof. Whether
the Court will provide an immediate solution to the problem, however, depends on the extent of the Court's findings. One possibility is
that the Court will agree with the Third Circuit decision in Marroquin-Manriquez and uphold the "clear" probability" standard. This
result would be contrary to the intent of Congress because it would
ignore the legislature's adoption of the new "well-founded fear" test
as defined by the Protocol. Another possibility would be for the
Court to affirm the Second Circuit's holding in Stevic, which mandates a more lenient standard as a result of the Refugee Act of
1980. While this possibility would be consistent with the new definition of "refugee," it fails to provide the necessary guidelines for implementation of the new "well-founded fear" standard. The most effective solution would be for the Court to concur with Stevic and to
set forth the requirements of the standard pursuant to the recommendations of the Handbook. Such a decision would require the
INS and the federal courts to follow the same standard for determining asylum eligibility, and provide a means of achieving the
objectives set forth by Congress in the Refugee Act of 1980.
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